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1. Introduction 
An important part of Anthony Ogus’ stimulating scholarship deals with the topic of 
legal convergence.1 His writings are a wonderful source of inspiration for anyone 
who is searching for a theoretical framework to understand present efforts to 
Europeanize private law. This short contribution deals with a question that has 
come to play an important role in the debate about European private law: the 
purported lack of democratic input in drafting rules in this area. It is of course well 
known that the Europeanization process prompts the need for new forms of 
legitimacy,2 but this debate has received new impetus in the area of private law with 
the efforts to produce a so-called Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). An 
important strand of scholarship claims that this DCFR is too much the product of 
legal scholars, where it should be the work of politicians and in particular of 
parliaments. This supposedly leads to a lack of democratic legitimacy of private 
law. In the background is the more general question of the exact relationship 
between private law and (national) democracy. I will argue that the relationship 
between European private law and democracy is often misunderstood and that in 
this respect criticism on the DCFR is not justified – although I have heavily criticised 
the DCFR myself for various other reasons.3 
2. Europeanization and private law: a democratic deficit? 
It seems appropriate to start with a brief sketch of the background to the present 
debate. As is well known, the (now) European Union has been active in the core 
 
 * Jan Smits is professor of European Private Law and Comparative Law at Tilburg University 
(Tilburg Institute of Comparative and Transnational Law – TICOM). Published in: Michael 
Faure & Frank Stephen (eds.), Essays in the Law and Eonomics of Regulation in Honour of 
Anthony Ogus, 49-59. 
1 Cf. Ogus 2007; Garoupa & Ogus 2006; Ogus 2002; Ogus 1999. 
2 See, among others, Curtin 1997. 
3 My critical assessment of the DCFR can be found in Smits 2008b and in Smits 2008a. 
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areas of private law since the 1980’s, leading to an acquis of approximately 20 
directives.4 This acquis has been criticised for various reasons. One is that the 
various directives often contradict each other, another is that the acquis is only a 
fragmentary set of rules. It is also not clear why the European legislator does not 
cover all topics related to the internal market, making the acquis quite arbitrary.5 
These deficiencies prompted the European Commission to start a debate about the 
future of European private law. Three ‘communications’6 finally led to the 
Commission’s decision to draft a ‘common frame of reference.’ This will provide 
definitions of legal terms, fundamental principles and model rules and can be used 
as a ‘toolbox’7 for the European legislator, as a source of inspiration for the ECJ and 
national courts, and as an optional code for contracting parties that want to make 
the CFR the law applicable to their contract. In December 2007, a draft for this 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) was presented to the European Commission.8 
Whatever the fate of the DCFR will be – the European Commission recently 
indicated it will aim primarily for a less ambitious revision of eight important 
directives9 – it has prompted an interesting debate about the legitimacy of the 
present text. It was drafted by legal scholars united in the Study Group on a European 
Civil Code and in the Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (the so-called 
‘acquis-group’)10 and is in this respect a typical example of Professorenrecht. This is 
also acknowledged by the drafters, who presented their text as an ‘academic CFR’, a 
scholarly product that is not politically legitimised and that at its best could form 
the basis for a ‘political CFR’ to be drafted by the European Commission. But it is 
difficult to deny that, in drafting the DCFR, many relevant choices were made. In a 
recent thesis, Bas van Zelst sketches the objections against this working method:11 
‘This seems worrying from two different angles. First of all, the scholars that are 
involved in the drafting of the DCFR lack democratic legitimacy. The group represents 
neither all of the populations of the Member States, nor their political convictions. 
Secondly, it is questionable whether professors should be vested with the translation of 
social-political reality into legislation. In a democratic society, this would seem to 
principally be the task of the (democratically legitimised) legislature (…).’ 
Other authors, most of them united in yet another group, namely the Study Group on 
Social Justice in European Private Law,12 also hold the view that Europeanization of 
private law should take place in a more democratic way. This would not only be 
true for the DCFR, but for any attempt to create a European private law. These 
 
4 All directives can be found in Ars Aequi Wetseditie 2006. 
5 See, with many details, Smits 2006, p. 55 et seq. 
6 European Commission 2001; European Commission 2003; European Commission 2004. 
7 European Commission 2004, p. 14. 
8 Von Bar, Clive & Schulte-Nölke 2008. 
9 European Commission 2007. Also see Second progress report on the CFR of 25 July 2007, 
COM (2007) 447. 
10 These are the two most important groups in the Joint Network on European Private Law, a so-
called netwerk of excellence financed by the European Commission. 
11 Van Zelst 2008, p. 244-245. 
12 See notably Hesselink 2004; Hesselink 2006; Grundmann 2005, p. 184; Study Group on Social 
Justice 2004, p. 653 et seq.; Mattei 2003, p. 107 et seq. 
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authors are clearly influenced by the Critical Legal Studies view that all law 
(including private law) is politics.13 If private law shapes the distribution of wealth 
in a modern society, creating a future European private law is primarily a political 
process: the rules of contract law that account for the right mix between the free 
market and social justice should therefore be determined in a democratic way. Only 
consulting ‘stakeholders’ and legal practice in drafting new European rules – as the 
European Commission proposes – is then not enough: instead, the European 
Parliament and national legislators have to be involved.14 
The question that interests us in this contribution is whether private law and 
democracy are really related in the way described in the above. The importance of 
this question is paramount: if Van Zelst and the Study Group on Social Justice are 
right, it means that private law can only come about in a democratic decision 
process. I believe this view is mistaken. The three reasons for this are set out in the 
next three sections. 
3. Realising ‘democracy’ through jurisdictional competition 
The first reason why (private) law does not need a democratic basis in decisions of a 
parliament is that there is often another and better way to establish preferences of 
citizens. The reference is, of course, to the theory of jurisdictional competition 
developed by the American author Charles Tiebout (1924-1968).15 When parties 
have freedom of choice as to the applicable legal regime (as is already the case in 
large parts of company and contract law), they will choose the regime they like best. 
This view has come to play an important role in the present debate about European 
private law: authors favouring legal diversity over forms of centralist lawmaking 
invariably invoke the argument of jurisdictional competition. In the Netherlands, 
this line of thinking is typically associated with (former) scholars of the Maastricht 
Faculty of Law16 – even to such an extent that mention was made of a ‘Romantic 
Law School of Maastricht.’17 
What is sometimes forgotten with respect to this argument is that Tiebout 
invented jurisdictional competition as an alternative to allocating local public goods 
by a political decision process. He showed18 that preferences of citizens need not be 
established in a democratic process, but can also be established by allowing citizens 
to choose for a regime they like. For Tiebout, these were households choosing to live 
in a particular community, but it is clear that also a choice of a particular legal 
regime, without a party moving physically, is an alternative to voting with one’s 
feet. 
It is quite clear that there are limits to establishing preferences by jurisdictional 
competition. One limit is when it comes to law regarded as mandatory by a state. 
 
13 Cf. Kennedy 1976, p. 1685 and Kennedy 2002, p. 7. 
14 Cf. Study Group on Social Justice 2004, p. 669. 
15 Tiebout 1956. 
16 See in particular Faure & Hartlief 2003, p. 170 et seq., Smits 2000 and, of course, Anthony 
Ogus himself. 
17 Nieuwenhuis 2003, p. 61 et seq. 
18 As a reaction to in particular Samuelson 1954, who had claimed that an efficient level of 
public goods cannot be produced. 
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Another one – as economists have made very clear – is that the opportunity of ‘exit’ 
is not enough to create an efficient level of regulation. On the one hand, this is the 
case because local governments (or states) do not, unlike commercial entities, go out 
of business and can thus continue to offer inefficient legal regimes. This means that 
some democratic control mechanism for the suppliers of law is still needed. On the 
other hand, it was argued that one also needs an element of ‘voice’:19 if one is 
dissatisfied with a jurisdiction, one need not necessarily leave it. One can also try to 
influence the political decision makers to improve that jurisdiction. Such ‘exit’ and 
‘voice’ interact: if there is more opportunity for criticism, parties are less likely to 
leave their jurisdiction. Likewise, if exit is easy, voice will be used less.20 
But even if these restrictions are accepted, jurisdictional competition remains 
an important alternative to centralist lawmaking in the area of contracts (the 
backbone of the DCFR). This means that the ‘democracy thesis’ of the authors 
mentioned in the previous section is based on a view of lawmaking that is not 
necessarily the only one conceivable. In particular in the area of contract law, 
jurisdictional competition may be a much better way to achieve ‘democratic’ input 
than traditional democratic decision making by States. This does mean, however, 
that we have to abandon the idea of only one legitimate group responsible for 
lawmaking. Too often, only nation-states are seen as legitimate democratic 
lawmakers. But in an increasingly globalising and interconnected world, there is no 
necessary relationship between the nation-state and the legitimacy of law. The 
number of legal regimes need not be the same as the number of nation-states.21 
4. Democratic input: the experience of optional instruments 
The second reason why the ‘democracy thesis’ may be wrong is that it adopts a very 
traditional view of what constitutes democratic input. It suggests that the input of 
parliaments should be given in the drafting process and not at some later stage. This 
is clearly in line with the view that all law is politics and changing of the law 
therefore requires political decisions. However, this view is clearly contradicted by 
our experience with the drafting of civil codes. 
First, even mandatory national civil codes were often drafted without much 
input of parliaments. True, the final decision about the enactment of a code is taken 
by national parliaments (and when it would come to the introduction of a binding 
European Civil Code, this should also be the case), but in drafting the code, the 
relevant decisions are usually made by the drafters themselves.22 This makes sense 
because of the often highly detailed and technical questions involved in the drafting 
process. Only when it comes to politically sensitive issues (such as the establishment 
of the proper level of consumer protection), parliaments should be involved. An 
important exception to this working method was the procedure followed when the 
 
19 Hirschman 1970. Cf. Fennell 2001. 
20 Fennell 2001. 
21 Cf. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner 2004. 
22 Also see Van den Berg 2007, who shows how the French Code Civil, the Austrian Allgemeines 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht and the Wetboek Napoleon ingerigt 
voor het Koningrijk Holland came into place. 
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new Dutch Civil Code was put into place. Immediately after the start of the drafting 
process, a list of questions about key issues was put before Dutch parliament. 
However, in so far as these questions involved matters of the code’s structure and 
other typically scholarly issues, I do not see how any input of parliament can be 
helpful. Thus, the question whether a general action for unjust enrichment should 
be part of the Code is not a question to be decided by parliament. 
But there is a more important point. Present efforts to Europeanize private law 
– and in particular the work on the DCFR – will not lead to rules binding in the 
same way as we are familiar with at the national level. The DCFR will only be a 
source of inspiration for the European legislator and courts or provide rules for an 
optional contract code. This implies that the legitimacy of the rules need not be 
found in a traditional democratic decision process. This is confirmed by the success 
of various optional instruments that came into place without any input of 
parliament in the stage of drafting. Instead, the input consisted of a parliamentary 
decision to adopt an already existing instrument drafted by legal experts. The two 
most important examples of such instruments in the field of uniform law are the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG). In both cases, the only democratic input consisted of the individual 
American state parliaments adopting the UCC and of the national parliaments 
adopting the CISG. If there is anything we can learn from this experience, it is that 
parliaments do not need to be involved in drafting a successful optional 
instrument.23 
5. Private law: design or organism? 
There is still a third reason why (European) private law does not always need to be 
legitimised in a democratic way. Compared to the two arguments discussed above, 
this reason refers to a more general understanding of private law and is therefore 
the most ambitious claim this contribution makes. If private law is made 
subordinate to democratic decision making, it is a means to a (political) end.24 It is 
the view of private law as a matter of conscious design by some legislator. Again, 
there is an alternative: one can also look at private law as the result of a long process 
of trial and error, of spontaneous development towards the standards a community 
prefers. Looked at in this way, private law is much more independent from State 
institutions. I believe this understanding of private law is more in line with how it 
has developed over the ages (also in the civil law world25), providing this area of the 
law with its own rationality independent from any public aim.26 
If we thus understand private law more as an organism than as a product of 
explicit design, it becomes clear why democratic input in this area of law can only 
have a limited impact. The Machbarkeit (‘makeability) of the law of contracts, tort 
and property is limited and a view in which private law is seen as an instrument to 
 
23 The opposite view of Van Zelst 2008 does not seem to be supported by the materials he 
presents. 
24 Cf. Tamanaha 2006. 
25 See for a different view the famous article by Glaeser & Shleifer 2001. 
26 Hayek 1973-1979; Weinrib 1995, p. 6. 
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change the existing distribution of power and riches,27 should be looked at with 
suspicion. It would mean that private law serves distributive justice, a view 
defended before by Anthony Kronman.28 The most important objection against it is 
that distributive justice requires a political decision to choose, out of all possible 
distributions of wealth, one that best establishes the desired collective social, 
economic or political goal. If private law is thus made part of establishing distribute 
justice, it is made subordinate to this goal; if it is not reached, it fails. In my view, it 
is not the State that is to decide ex ante what a just private law requires. At its best, 
the result can be corrected ex post.29 Moreover, redistribution of welfare through (in 
particular) contract law is doomed to failure because future contracting parties are 
not likely to contract with ‘weaker’ parties if they would run the risk of avoidance 
of their contract. This is also the message of Charles Fried:30 
‘Redistribution is not a burden to be borne in a random, ad hoc way by those who 
happen to cross paths with persons poorer than themselves. Such a conception, heart-
warmingly spontaneous though it may be, would in the end undermine our ability to 
plan and to live our lives as we choose.’ 
This is not to say that democratic input is never useful. In a recent paper Nuno 
Garoupa and Anthony Ogus31 distinguish between interventionist law (such as 
regulatory law and those aspects of private law that protect parties assumed to be 
weaker, such as consumers and employees) and facilitative law (such as large parts 
of contract and company law). They argue that here is no expectation that 
competition between national legal systems will lead to convergence in areas where 
intervention is frequent. In interventionist law, preferences as to the levels of 
intervention vary between countries.32 Building upon this analysis, we can assume 
that (national) democratic input is useful precisely in case of interventionist law. In 
facilitative law, preferences are better revealed by jurisdictional competition. 
6. Concluding remarks 
This brief contribution showed that the relationship between private law and 
democracy is not as straightforward as is sometimes assumed. Legitimacy of private 
law cannot only be established through the national democratic institutions, but 
also in other ways. The Draft Common Frame of Reference for a European private 
law is an important example of this: as a non-binding instrument, it need not fulfil 
the same requirements as binding law. But also private law in the more traditional 
sense does not always have to be legitimised at the State level: the democratic 
functions of law can sometimes be provided by others than the State. Under what 
circumstances this is allowed merits further study, as are many other aspects 
touched upon above. If these aspects are looked at in more detail – as I hope to do in 
 
27 Cf. Study Group on Social Justice 2004, p. 653 et seq. 
28 Kronman 1980, p. 472 et seq. 
29 Cf. Weinrib 1995, p. 211 et seq. 
30 Fried 1981, p. 106. 
31 Garoupa & Ogus 2006. 
32 Garoupa & Ogus 2006, p. 341-342. 
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the coming years – there is little doubt that Anthony Ogus’ writings will continue to 
be a wonderful source of inspiration. 
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